So awhile ago in an attempt to get even in a personal conflict one Harvard Law student (Yelena Shagall¹) forwarded an email with controversial racial comments by her rival (Stephanie Grace²) to other parties likely to make sure it got published and ruined her rivals career. While I was stunned by the sheer Machiavellian evil of Yelena Shagall at first I just read a tiny snippet and some commentary and not really paying much attention assumed that the inference of racist motives was reasonable if too weak to justify the harsh reaction. After reading the full email my response has totally changed. Not only is the email not suggestive of racism it’s eminently reasonable and the absurd attempts to condemn the sentiment and the writer bear a disconcerting similarity to the methods employed to try witches in the middle ages. I mean when everyone insists they are taking the scientific and evidential high road but feel the claim is just too obvious and absurd to respond with evidence rather than outrage something is fishy. Now some of the accusations of racism are expected but even the moderate and sympathetic articles seem to take it for granted the email was racist. Worse rather than have the courage to step up and defend the claims in the email as eminently reasonable the Harvard leadership and the academic community more generally threw the student under the bus. That’s disgusting behavior and I think academics have a duty to stand up when this kind of crap happens and publicly admit that, while hardy a model of good communication, this is a completely reasonable way for an academic to express a eminently defensible position.

In fact while I have a few small quibbles I would certainly not be ashamed to have sent a similar email. Moreover, even if you thought she got the science radically wrong that hardly makes her stand out. Most members of congress are totally scientifically illiterate and a non-trivial fraction of the country believes in UFOs or rejects Darwinism so surely scientific error is not cause for public hanging. Obviously the problem was she dared to even consider the truth of the ‘wrong conclusion’ and people wonder why there isn’t an open honest dialog about race in this country.

Just to hammer the point home let me go through the email point by point. I’d hope that other academics will, regardless of how clear cut they think the scientific questions at issue are, at least publicly indicate their horror at this reaction to a mere request for compelling evidence before totally rejecting a potential explanation.

I absolutely do not rule out the possibility that African Americans are, on average, genetically predisposed to be less intelligent. I could also obviously be convinced that by controlling for the right variables, we would see that they are, in fact, as intelligent as white people under the same circumstances.

While I could only be convinced that the genetic predispositions to intelligence (to the extent this makes sense) for the two racial groups was within a certain margin of error. Ultimately what is so deeply ironic about all the accusations that Stephanie Grace doesn’t understand the science it’s the people who are insisting that science has absolutely closed the book on the issue of statistical correlations between race and intelligence who don’t understand science. If there is one thing science has taught us about genetics it’s that it’s hugely complicated and there are likely to be a huge number of different gene variants that have some effect on ultimate intelligence³. Given this massive number of different variables, many of which correlate significantly with race⁴ it’s almost absurd to think all these different variables would perfectly balance out. That’s like betting that if you flip a coin 100 times and then flip it another 100 you will get the same number of heads both times. So it’s almost certain that, in a state of perfect racial equality, one race or another would have a slightly higher expected IQ as a result of genetic factors⁵.

Of course one might reasonably insist that the standard rules of conversational implicature make it clear that Stephanie Grace isn’t just allowing for the possibility that by pure chance there are a couple more blacks with some rare congenital mental defect than whites. Obviously what she means not to rule out is the existence of certain genetic variants that correlate reasonably strongly with racial categories that will ultimately be demonstrated to grant some kind of slight increase in intelligence/improvement in brain function. Moreover, implicitly one can take her also to be saying one can’t rule out the fact that some non-trivial amount of the observed intelligence differences between races, in particular the worse results of blacks in measures of IQ, are a result of these genetic variations.

Now there are some some good scientific reasons to think that the vast majority of the observed racial gap in IQ scores, even after controlling for as much as possible, would disappear in an equitable environment. For instance the size of the lead African-American girls have over African-American boys resembles that of past ethnic groups whose average IQ scores used to lag behind the national average. So I certainly wouldn’t bet on any non-trivial fraction of the observed IQ gap turning out to be deeply genetic⁶. But our continued failure to pinpoint the exact social or cultural factors responsible and the continued intractability of questions about the relation between gender and various intellectual skills makes it totally crazy to categorically rule out this possibility⁷.

The fact is, some things are genetic. African Americans tend to have darker skin. Irish people are more likely to have red hair. (Now on to the more controversial:) Women tend to perform less well in math due at least in part to prenatal levels of testosterone, which also account for variations in mathematics performance within genders.

She isn’t pulling this out of her ass. There is some pretty suggestive evidence that testosterone does impact math/science ability (though these seem to indicate the optimal level is in the low male range). Note that all the trumpeted claims about women doing just as well on math tests as guys amount to squat since women actually do better on academic tests across the board then men.

This suggests to me that some part of intelligence is genetic, just like identical twins raised apart tend to have very similar IQs and just like I think my babies will be geniuses and beautiful individuals whether I raise them or give them to an orphanage in Nigeria. I don’t think it is that controversial of an opinion to say I think it is at least possible that African Americans are less intelligent on a genetic level, and I didn’t mean to shy away from that opinion at dinner.

Note that her phrasing here makes it pretty clear that she is simply refusing to rule out the possibility. Now I don’t know her so I have no idea if she’s a racist but this is a completely reasonable, if misunderstandable, way for someone to merely express the belief that the science hasn’t yet conclusively ruled out this possibility. Indeed it has not. It’s given us suggestive grounds to think the answer goes one way but it at this point we simply can’t hope to conclusively rule out this kind of possibility. There are just too many confounding variables and far too much complexity to achieve that level of certainty.

Despite some of the accusations obviously Stephanie is merely using Nigeria as an example of a location where children receive insufficient resources and substandard care relative to what we have available in the United States. Bizarrely some critics seem to think Stephanie is suggesting no one in Nigeria is pretty or smart when this is plainly at complete odds with the claim being made (even with poor resources people can turn out well).

I also don’t think that there are no cultural differences or that cultural differences are not likely the most important sources of disparate test scores (statistically, the measurable ones like income do account for some raw differences).

Now she goes out of her way to emphasize she isn’t rejecting the idea that the observered differences in intelligence measurements are primarly the result of environmental factors. Exactly what one would do if you were trying to express the correct view that we simply don’t have the kind of scientific evidence that would let us totally rule out, as opposed to simply judge to be unlikely, a substantial genetic effect. For the love of god what else do you want this woman to say to make it clear that she is just reasonably refusing to regard a scientific possibility as foreclosed until she is handed conclusive evidence.

I would just like some scientific data to disprove the genetic position, and it is often hard given difficult to quantify cultural aspects. One example (courtesy of Randall Kennedy) is that some people, based on crime statistics, might think African Americans are genetically more likely to be violent, since income and other statistics cannot close the racial gap. In the slavery era, however, the stereotype was of a docile, childlike, African American, and they were, in fact, responsible for very little violence (which was why the handful of rebellions seriously shook white people up). Obviously group wide rates of violence could not fluctuate so dramatically in ten generations if the cause was genetic, and so although there are no quantifiable data currently available to “explain” away the racial discrepancy in violent crimes, it must be some nongenetic cultural shift. Of course, there are pro-genetic counterarguments, but if we assume we can control for all variables in the given time periods, the form of the argument is compelling.

Ok, maybe you want her to add this just to make it extra clear she understands that bias and stereotype can in fact cause observed differences in outcome. Clearly she is outlining here what she wants to see to be convinced that the genetic hypothesis for the observed underperformance of blacks on intelligence tests is untenable. I mean how can someone possibly be engaging in the transparent racist misunderstanding of the science alleged when they are simply asking you to provide the correct scientific argument.

It’s this that gives the outraged condemnations the air of a religious inquisition. If they actually had the kind of totally conclusive scientific arguments they insist exist then presumably they’d be happy to simply share them with people like Stephanie Grace so they too are on the right page. Suspiciously not one of the condemnations I’ve seen, for all they fault Stephanie Grace for insufficient science, cite a single relevant study to rebut her supposedly absurd view. Apparently we are supposed to divine citations to the relevant work through the sheer force of our outrage.

In conclusion, I think it is bad science to disagree with a conclusion in your heart, and then try (unsuccessfully, so far at least) to find data that will confirm what you want to be true. Everyone wants someone to take 100 white infants and 100 African American ones and raise them in Disney utopia and prove once and for all that we are all equal on every dimension, or at least the really important ones like intelligence. I am merely not 100% convinced that this is the case.

Very true Stephanie. Sadly you underestimated just how vicious people can be when you draw attention to what their doing. Unlike me most people haven’t actually read enough studies about genetics and intelligence to have any reason to bet that most of the observed differences are behavioral. However, it’s extremely important to people’s worldview that this be true and vital to their self-image that they believe it to be true. Thus when you challenge that view people’s natural response is to strike out to hide their underlying insecurity and lash out at the cause of the painful mental tension.

I wish there was a facebook group to offer Stephanie support but I suppose that’s not in her best interest.

So if you spend any time reading the semi-popular scientific press, listen to NPR or are exposed to the skeptical community you will eventually run into the claim that (human) races don’t exist. Sometimes it’s phrased as a scientific discovery other times the idea that there are different races like Caucasian, oriental etc.. is ‘debunked’ but almost always there is a pretty transparent underlying motivation to scold those bad racist people who make claims about comparative racial abilities or at least to demonstrate just how different we mature objective scientists types are from the people who try and link race and ability. The recent debate over a racist sounding (without context) personal email by a Harvard law student has triggered another round of these supposedly scientific absolution.

Now if one was really looking to be scientific or skeptical rather than merely seeking to affirm membership in a certain social/political group this claim should set off two sets of alarm bells. The first set because it’s such a convenient thing to be true. After all if science has proven their aren’t really races then you don’t have to worry about troubling questions like the relationship between race and intelligence so you can go on thinking of yourself both as a good liberal¹ and a critical thinker. Indeed, as soon as one acknowledges the notion of race then the sheer number of correlations between racial background and various gene sequences makes it downright absurd to insist that there isn’t some statistical difference in genetic predisposition to intelligence between different races². Of course we have good evidence that any such correlation will be small compared to environmental effects and individual differences and (to my knowledge) have no particular reason to suspect that the result won’t be ‘favorable’ for traditionally disadvantaged groups but subtle qualifications like this won’t eliminate the suspicion the admission draws. So like belief in an afterlife, trust in homeopathic remedies, or credence in the Loch Less monster there are obvious reasons people would believe the claim regardless of it’s truth giving us cause to be suspicious.

The other alarm bell is the fact that this claim contradicts what we see so plainly with our eyes. People from difference regions of the world look different. People with an African background have a different skin color than those from a European or Oriental background. Kenyan runners seem to do disproportionately well in marathon races³ and hair color/type highly correlates with what part of the world your family comes from. These differences are too obvious for the people claiming that scientifically race doesn’t exist to simply brush off so they try to explain it by saying that there is indeed a socially constructed notion of race it’s simply the genetic notion that doesn’t exist.

This response can’t possibly fly. The differences in skin, eye and hair color aren’t socially constructed. They are determined (largely) by your genetics. It’s a simple and obvious fact that there are substantial correlations between one’s genetic makeup and where your ancestors come from and these genetic differences are surely not only superficial. A child’s risk of sickle cell anemia is highly dependent on the parent’s racial background and we are slowly discovering that race significantly alters one’s susceptibility to many other afflictions and the probable effectiveness of various drugs. In light of this facially compelling proof of the existence of racial genetic variation what kind of scientific result could possibly be described as showing that there is no such thing as race?

Well the true scientific claim in the background is that the boundaries we draw between various racial groups are arbitrary and purely a matter of social construction. In other words if we analyzed everyone’s genes they wouldn’t group into a small number of tidy piles and certainly not ones that match our (culturally) standard categories like black, white, oriental, Indian, etc.. Instead of black/white/oriental/Indian/Native American it might make just as much sense to have Native American & Oriental/White & Indian/Northern African/South African instead. These racial categories might not be as useful in describing the social and cultural fault lines in American society but they (or some alternative like them) would be no less correlated with various genetic risks and just as useful in medical recommendations.

While it’s important to point out that we draw racial boundaries in (genetically) arbitrary places this no more shows that scientifically speaking race doesn’t exist than the fact that light comes in a continuous spectrum shows that scientifically speaking color doesn’t exist. Indeed, we know that different cultures break apart the visible spectrum in different ways but that doesn’t mean that science disproves the fact that blue and green are distinct colors. To illustrate just how much this claim distorts the truth just imagine someone insisting that scientifically speaking baldness didn’t exist because just how few hairs you need to qualify as bald is culturally determined.

It’s bad enough when scientists advance this claim but I understand that they may be trying to balance accuracy with other concerns such as their career, combating racist distortions of the truth in soundbites, and keeping the trust of various political and social coalitions. I still think that in the long run the failure of scientists to reign in this kind of political pandering risks compromising the public’s trust in their objectivity but at least I have some sympathy with their misrepresentation. However, it particularly galls me when skeptical groups participate in this kind of distortion while claiming to exist primarily to oppose just this kind of wishful thinking.

So over at ars they had an article clearing the scientists at the CRU (the guys with the leaked emails) saying that while other statistical methods and approaches would have been superior that’s hardly misconduct. In the conversation about after the post someone was complaining about the ‘absurdity’ of not requiring the highest quality analysis and the most bulletproof possible experimental evidence for an issue like climate change. I was immediately struck by the huge gulf, which on reflection I suspect is widespread, between how people treat scientific evidence and claims and how they treat everyday questions of truth and falsity in their own lives.

However, science is nothing but the process of deciding what you think is true and if people really understood science in this way I think we’d have a lot less confusion about global warming. There is nothing different about the way disputes in science are settled than the way you might settle an argument with your friend about whose route from work to the bar is faster (suppose you have serious money riding on the question so it really matters). So let’s just consider what you’d likely do to decide the bet and see how that would apply in the scientific context. I’m using climate change here as a particular example but virtually everyone who isn’t close to the scientific community is equally guilty as this disconnect underlies many of the unreasonable public expectations about science.

When the argument begins you’d both point out factors that give credence to your route being the faster one based on existing knowledge. Often that alone will be enough to settle the question. If your friend reminds you about the new stoplights the city added on your route recently you might well decide he’s almost surely right and it’s not worth putting to the test. Or maybe his arguments are strong enough that you’d demand very favorable odds to make another bet on your route but you are still unsure enough you think it’s worth testing. (Or you could have the better argument or neither of course).

The next thing you would do do settle the question if debate persisted would be to perform an experiment. You’d probably suggest that you each drive your own routes to the bar that night and see who gets their first. Of course this kind of rough and ready check is far from an ideal controlled study with powerful statistical analysis but whether or not you the experiment convinces you depends on not only it’s quality but also the strength of the results and your prior judgments of plausibility.

In other words if your friend’s remark about the stop lights made you think he was probably right and then he reached the bar in 15 minutes while you took over 30 you’d probably find that quite persuassive and take the issue to be settled. If the results were closer, say 23 vs. 30 minutes and you know your friends a calm steady driver you might still be convinced despite the lack of experimental control for driver differences but if you know he’s highly competitive and given to speeding you might insist on having a mutual friend drive both routes to control for driver speeding. Still, as long as the results aren’t in conflict with your prior expectations, e.g., it’s the shorter, fewer stops route that is coming in as faster you’d probably be convinced without any need to throw powerful statistical methods at the question even though losing cost you a big chunk of change.

On the other hand the very same experimental results probably wouldn’t be enough to convince you if they were in radical conflict with your prior knowledge about the workings of traffic and driving. For instance if google maps said your route was shorter, had a higher speed limit, fewer stops and less traffic you’d probably suspect that the couple of tests you’d done weren’t convincing enough and demand many trials with a test of statistical significance (or compelling theoretical justification of why your route might be slower…say being told all your turns are unprotected left turns while he has right turns) before you agreed to pay up on the bet. The lower the prior probability you assign to the observed outcome and the closer the observed average times are the more statistical rigor you would insist on before paying up.

Importantly, while better controlled experiments with more powerful statistical techniques (if understood) are always better it doesn’t mean other tests can’t add to the weight of evidence. Even if you and your buddy got a third party to do many trials and used tests of statistical significance if your buddy Bob tells you he drives your way and always gets their after his wife who drives your friends way it still adds to the strength of your case despite the low number of trials and uncontrolled variables like the driver (just much less so).

So let’s take this back to the climate science situation. Would it be even better if the CRU scientists had used more powerful statistical techniques correctly? Sure. But all experiments are imperfect but they can still provide valuable evidence just like the initial tests or Bob’s anecdote in my story. Not only is it not bad for scientists to publish results from imperfect experiments it’s important for them to do so as long as other scientists aren’t being mislead about the strength of the tests/results (the scientific community seems unsurprised about the underlying statistical techniques used so it’s reasonable to assume they probably had a good sense of the strength of the evidence published). In fact often it’s preferable for scientists to publish imperfect experimental results with non-ideal methods of analysis and invest their time in new experiments instead of investing the time/energy to apply more powerful mathematical techniques to a particular result. For instance I think it was probably a good decision on Galileo’s part to let the crude experiments with balls on inclined planes and simple timers convince him objects all accelerate at the same rate under gravity than to insist on waiting for fancy statistics and running many tests. That way he could say important things about the heliocentric model as well.

Ultimately what’s wrong with the expectation that papers giving evidence on matters of enormous public concern always live up to some kind of school book ideal of scientific experimentation is that it makes a single paper stand in for the mountains of accumulated evidence. I mean complaining about all these minor ‘imperfections’ in climate research is like arguing that we shouldn’t assume it takes longer to drive from New York to LA than from Chicago to LA because the people who had made the drives never had a proper control. If you have shitloads of distinct pieces of evidence for a claim (like many people saying 2 days for Chicago LA and 3 days for NY LA) which is supported by a sound theoretical justification (NY is farther away) demanding the tests be redone with the right formal methods (controls/better statistics/etc..) would make no noticeable difference in your (rational) confidence of the claim.

Equally problematic is the background assumption that most public criticisms of consensus scientific results tend to ignore the critical importance of prior probabilities. For instance if there was one thing I think that most people on both sides of the climate debate ignore (or glass over) is the high prior probability we should assign to anthropogenic global warming. Basic thermodynamic considerations tell us that absent some unexpected large systematic effect of CO2 emissions to create cooling it must cause global warming and that human emissions are large enough that we should expect them to give rise to the level of warming observed. This isn’t some crazy computer model or complex bit of climate science subject to judgment calls. Just look up a few basic values for light absorption by CO2, strength of solar radiation and the (directly observed by satellite) level of reflected solar radiation and you can work it out on a single piece of paper.

So it’s the guys who want to deny anthropogenic global warming who have the burden of proof to convince us there is some unexpected process that gives rise to a seemingly paradoxical absence of anthropogenic global warming. Given this context merely suggestive experimental results supporting the accuracy of this simple model are enough to up our confidence from “likely” to “almost certain.” These scientists should no more waste time polishing these experiments than they should spend money rigorously verifying the earth is round. In other words we already have SOOO much evidence that making this paper a bit more persuasive wouldn’t budge our rational confidence.

A similar point applies to resistance to things like food irradiation or other all natural type movements. As with climate change the prior probabilities are ignored and the burden is shifted from the person suggesting the possibility of novel unexpected mechanisms to those who are simply claiming that things work the way we reasonably expect them to work.

In my view one of the most glaring indictments of the way philosophy and other humanities are taught and practiced is the senseless insistence on reading original works by the great masters. This is most apparent in the continued consumption of Plato, Hobbes, Aristotle and the like in philosophy but can be equally well be seen in the reverance for Chaucer, Shakespeare or other literary classics. To my horror this reverence for the original works is even being promoted in economics. So even though I gave a short reply in the comments at overcoming bias when this issue came up I’ve been meaning to discuss the question in more detail.

For the moment I’d like to set aside the issue of literature for another post and focus on subjects like philosophy and economics where (at least in theory) the aim is to genuinely progress towards a (more) accurate/useful understanding. Since I find it genuienly perplexing why one would ever feel the need to read the originals rather than the digested and improved material found in modern expositions as one does in math of physics I’ll quote Tyler Cowen’s justifications for returning to the original thinkers. Obviously these don’t represent every possible justification but they are the best justifications I’ve ever heard.

First though I’d like to be perfectly clear that the issue under consideration is whether there is some pedagogical benefit to reading original thinkers as opposed to modern summaries (of either the original thinker or simply the current state of the discipline). There is no accounting for taste so if you simply have some Plato fetish or like the way reading Plato makes you feel sophisticated you might find it more enjoyable to read Plato rather than more modern work just as someone else might prefer to have their philosophical arguments interspersed in Harry Potter slash. Also if your interest is in original historical research then influential works are a reasonable thing to read¹ but again the question at hand is the benefit of reading original works by great thinkers to the advancement of the discipline itself not it’s history or the practitioners feelings of sophistication. With this point clear let’s examine what Tyler Cowen has to say point by point.

1. Secondary sources are unreliable and they do not capture or understand many of the original insights. To remove it from the distant past, what I get from John Rawls or Robert Nozick is quite distinct from what I get from their distillers.

So what? The standard isn’t whether a latter distillation captures the exact content but whether it’s a more effective way to gain understanding. Reading a modern calculus book is extremely different from reading the original Newton. Newton’s notions of infinitesimals and fluxions have been excisced wholesale and replaced with the modern notions of limits and epsilon-delta proofs and that’s a huge improvement in the ability of calculus books to convey understanding.

2. Truly great thinkers require numerous distillers. Can you read just one book on Keynes? No. So you have to read a few. Shouldn’t one of these then be Keynes himself? Yes.

This presupposes the goal is to understand what Keynes thought. Keynes was a brilliant economist but he was just as human as the rest of us and some of his ideas were simply confused or poorly thought out. The benefit of later distillers is to transmit the insights while avoiding the confusions, so no, one of these shouldn’t be Keynes himself.

I mean imagine Keynes was really a highlander and was still alive and at the height of his intellectual powers. Who would it be more beneficial to read the 1936 Keynes or the 2010 Keynes who has used the intervening years to excise the confused parts of The General Theory and find more lucid explanations of the key insights? Surely it’s the 2010 Keynes who would (likely) provide the better explanation (if you disagree would you go back to his half-assembled notes? Further?). Yet surely if Keynes could improve on his own work than (as the goal is to convey economic ideas not Keynes personal beliefs) surely others could as well, especially when the benefit from the collaboration and exchange of ideas provided the academic discipline.

3. The errors of top thinkers are often more interesting and instructive than their successes. Distillers have a hard time capturing these errors and their fruitfulness.

But that’s the wrong comparison. The right comparison is whether it’s more useful to build upon the work of past greats and digest this new material including the mistakes made by those who have built upon the great thinkers of the past than to spend time digesting the errors of the past. Obviously if it was costless one would read every book on the subject but the key question question is would the time spent exploring the errors made by Keynes be better spent exploring later work that builds upon his insights.. The reason it’s so tempting to advocate reading originals is that we don’t properly take into account the opportunity costs incurred reading those originals.

Moreover, given that there is only so much time for students (or professors) to devote to learning a subject either one must give up totally on the idea of making progress or admit that it’s sometimes more effective to substitute modern materials for some works of great thinkers. Hence this argument either proves too much (progress is impossible because it’s always better to learn from the mistakes of past great thinkers) or proves nothing at all since we continuously make beneficial trade offs of replacing originals with more modern works.

4. We often read great thinkers not to learn what they understood but also to set our minds racing and to find interesting new questions. Great thinkers are usually better at supplying this service than are their distillers.

Again this assumes that the job of the distiller is to summarize the original author. A good analysis book doesn’t summarize Newton it digests his insights and presents them as part of a grander theory. Reading a modern analysis book does a much better job a posing interesting new questions than does reading Newton.[^empirial]

Moreover, I suggest this is largely a placebo effect. One is told that the reading great thinkers in the original is particularly inspiring so we search for questions to inspire us. We would probably do equally well if told that Joyce’s Ulysses conveyed deep economic questions. If you doubt this consider the stunningly large number of people who, despite not being religious, claim to derive deep moral messages and insights from the bible despite it’s blatant encouragement of genocide, rape, and every other kind of brutality imaginable.

5. Sometimes the value is in having read common sources and benefiting from the commonality per se. Great thinkers are usually more focal than any of their distillers and thus reading them is a good input for discussions with others.

OFten this is simply false as influential textbooks and articles are often just as widely read. More importantly by virtue of the novelty of their ideas original thinkers are usually lacking in clarity meaning the same work is usually interpreted in a host of different ways.. However, even if true this argues for more canonical books. In mathematics this issue is solved by the publication of various yellow books that provide a common base for everyone to use as a reference and there is no reason not to do the same for other subjects.

6. Original sources often help you challenge or reexamine your world view or intellectual ethos. Distillers very often pander to that world view, while pretending to challenge you.

Given their status as influential originals the content in these works has largely been either incorporated into your modern world view or people have developed standard objections. I know my world view (or even philosophical position) has never been threatened by the original work of an past great thinker but often it’s been shaken by a new argument or idea from a modern source.

7. Consider a simple comparison. You can read either Adam Smith’s two major books or any ten or even twenty books on him, toss in articles if you wish. It’s a no-brainer which you should choose.

Right, neither. Who the hell cares what some dude named Adam Smith thought. Given the choice between reading a modern economic textbook and any of Adam Smith’s books I know which one I would choose and it’s the same thing we always choose for undergraduates.

8. The best distillers often are original sources in their own right (and in part unreliable expositors), such as in Charles Taylor’s excellent book on Hegel.

Again the false dichotomy. Instead of trying to find out what Hegel said we should be finding out what is true (which in the case of Hegel will involve simply ignoring him).

9. Distillation works best in very exact sciences, such as physics and mathematics. If you rely on distillation for an inexact science, you will do best at capturing its exact parts. You will be left with a systematic bias, and knowledge gap, regarding its inexact parts.

So it’s only when you can’t actually go out and check whether going back to read the original works by great thinkers that it’s beneficial? That’s awful suspicious

Stepping back for a moment I would point out the fact that there are many different mutually contradictory disciplines of theology (every major world religion has one). Thus regardless of your religious views (and especially if you are an atheist) you must admit that there are academic disciplines which are totally bullshit. Now I would point out that in virtually all instances of theological study the original work of prior influential (but not prophets or otherwise supernaturally gifted) theologians is regarded as similarly important to read in the original.

Hence, we must all admit there are situations where academic disciplines are convinced of the important of reading influential past thinkers in the original despite even though it provides no actual benefit. Conversely in all those disciplines where we have reliable quantatative measurements of progress (with the obvious exception of history) returning to the original works of past great thinkers is decidedly unhelpful. Therefore at the very least anyone who wishes to claim that reading past great thinkers in the original (be it Plato, Keynes, Aristotle or whomever) has a substantial argumentative burden to meet and until they do the assumption should be against spending time doing so.

This morning a story on slashdot linked to A Mathematician’s Lament by Paul Lockhart as well as a blog post discussing the issue. This is the first time I’ve read Lockhart’s rant but little of what he said was new to anyone who has listened to any of the mathematicians vocally crusading for better mathematics education. As usual most of his piece was the same unrealistic claptrap about how if we could only show the children the joy and beauty of math all would be well. It’s a pleasant fiction to believe, and it’s seductive to think that with just one little nudge all children could discover the pleasure we take in mathematics, but it’s about as reasonable as believing everyone would love to garden, read Shakespeare or anything else if they were only exposed to it.

To be fair I was quite impressed with Lockhart’s brutally frank analysis of what currently passes for mathematical edification in K-12. Apart from teaching kids to sit still and signaling social status¹, for 95% of the class everything after multiplication (and a good bit before) is totally pointless. Go talk to some doctors (GPs), lawyers, managers, etc.. to solve a simple algebra problem (say two linear equations in two unknowns) and see just how few have the slightest clue. No one’s benefiting by making them rotely memorize some rules they promptly forget. However, the notion that if we only taught children real math they would gobble it up is simply absurd.

I remember taking a differential geometry class in college that was taught in what was (at least for me) an abominable way. No rigor, just vague comments about pictures and twisting so unsurprisingly I kept putting that homework off and gradually falling further behind. At that point understanding became nigh impossible. Just doing the problem sets made me feel frustrated, angry and perhaps a bit inferior and I’m unreasonably over confident about my mathematical abilities. Naturally one then puts them off and when you force yourself to work you just grind through the problems without any curiosity or hope of understanding the bigger picture. Psychologically you just can’t force someone to be curious and deeply thoughtful about a subject that makes them feel bad and that’s what understanding math requires. So certainly a sufficently bad teacher (who won’t follow a book) can discourage real learning but could better teaching really significantly encourage real mathematical understanding in K-12?

Sure if you somehow eliminate the social significance of mathematical ability and turned math class into a non-threatening fun activity like most HS art classes you might make some progress. That, however, is simply impossible. Nothing the teacher says can erase the knowledge that actually showing interest and talent in mathematics opens up many lucrative doors and signals intelligence. So long as the mathematically gifted are financially rewarded students (and their parents) will care about how they perform in the subject. Unlike art or literature math also has right and wrong answers and can often leave one feeling lost and frustrated so unavoidably half your student body will resent math for making them feel stupid and inferior even if they would never admit it. No matter how excellent the teacher they can do no more than try to distract the under performing students from inevitable comparisons with those who are doing better. Worse, any attempt to discourage people who dislike the subject from taking the courses will simply increase the incentive for them to camouflage themselves as someone who does like math to future schools and bosses. The problem would be a lot easier if it was just that some people weren’t smart enough.

I don’t really know what we should do about this situation. However, I suspect one reason people are so reluctant to face this possibility is that it would require us to explicitly consider how we want to trade off the benefit to the small fraction students who could benefit immensely from non-rote proof based mathematics and in turn contribute disproportionately to our economic growth against the interests of the larger number of students who are too intimidated by the subject to do anything but rote work. I think we ought to consider using programming, with it’s more video game/slot machine pace of rewards, as the means to teach logic and quantitative thought but that still doesn’t answer the math question.

So browsing the web this morning I came across this amazing blog largely focused on the author’s (apparently a philosophy grad student somewhere) continentalist approach to Godel’s incompleteness theorem. Rather than describe the content I’ll just include his last post.

Perhaps this will be my last post here? A simple reiteration of negative Platonism, situating its significance in the context of awakening from the wrong expectations performed so thoroughly and unconsciously in the second Critique.

To put it once again with maximal simplicity: The diagonal is what relates, without religious/imaginary synthesis, our mathematical/cognitive and ethical/existential lives.

We already live in both places: in consistency through calculation and consciousness, in completeness through care and the unconscious. What we suffer from, as both theoretical inadequacy and ethical alienation, is an inability to relate these in a way that makes sense and is good.

Thus it has suddenly become possible, after long stagnation, to say something rigorous and suggestive, something that opens logoi both mathematically lucid and existentially thick (again without synthesis: it’s a matter of bridges and transitions, not of sovereign unities or systems) about the fundamental Socratic question: which knowledge, which part, of knowledge, would do us any good?

At stake here is exactly what gets talked about, prephilosophically, as “the meaning of life”. It is good philosophical practice to avoid this question until one has something real to say about it, and instead, to work the problem from either side. But it is not good practice, once the relation has become clear, to remain squeamish about naming it: Idea of the Good, Diagonalization.

Note, if you read the rest of the blog it’s totally clear that he really means diagnolization in the sense of the mathematical technique employed by Godel. Moreover, he seems to genuienly understand the mathematics (Godel’s theorem is a result in a meta-system describing provability in some formalized system) so what’s going on here is surely not mathematical confusion. It’s the philosophy that’s totally fucked (I’m pretty confident now that it’s not a hoax).

However, to be fair to this blogger, he isn’t some isolated crank, but rather a participant in a ‘respectable’ philosophical tradition. Indeed, one of the famous philosophers he references, Alain Badiou is even more incoherent. While he would almost certainly quibble with the description given on wikipedia if the following is even remotely accurate he might as well be spouting gibberish.

Badiou’s use of set theory in this manner is not just illustrative or heuristic. Badiou uses the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory to identify the relationship of being to history, Nature, the State, and God. Most significantly this use means that (as with set theory) there is a strict prohibition on self-belonging; a set cannot contain or belong to itself. Russell’s paradox famously ruled that possibility out of formal logic. (This paradox can be thought through in terms of a ‘list of lists that do not contain themselves’: if such a list does not write itself on the list the property is incomplete, as there will be one missing; if it does, it is no longer a list that does not contain itself.) So too does the axiom of foundation — or to give an alternative name the axiom of regularity — enact such a prohibition (cf. p. 190 in Being and Event). (This axiom states that all sets contain an element for which only the void [empty] set names what is common to both the set and its element.) Badiou’s philosophy draws two major implications from this prohibition. Firstly, it secures the inexistence of the ‘one’: there cannot be a grand overarching set, and thus it is fallacious to conceive of a grand cosmos, a whole Nature, or a Being of God. Badiou is therefore — against Cantor, from whom he draws heavily — staunchly atheist. However, secondly, this prohibition prompts him to introduce the event. Because, according to Badiou, the axiom of foundation ‘founds’ all sets in the void, it ties all being to the historico-social situation of the multiplicities of de-centred sets — thereby effacing the positivity of subjective action, or an entirely ‘new’ occurrence. And whilst this is acceptable ontologically, it is unacceptable, Badiou holds, philosophically. Set theory mathematics has consequently ‘pragmatically abandoned’ an area which philosophy cannot. And so, Badiou argues, there is therefore only one possibility remaining: that ontology can say nothing about the event.

For any readers familiar with set theory the part about drawing ethical maxim’s from Cohen’s method of forcing might be even more amusing. Sure, he is hardly the first continental philosopher I’ve read who should be properly regarded as a crackpot but when it’s about my subject (mathematical logic) it just makes the point all the more clearly.

Now reading this sort of BS is kinda amusing but I do have a broader point. Despite being essentially indistingushable from the sort of crank theories that pop up from physics crackpots all the time the people publishing this stuff are still seen as respectable, even acclaimed, philosophers. If philosophy wants to be a serious intellectual discipline it needs to take the same hard line that they physicists do about crackpots, even if it means tossing out entire university departments.

The physicists wouldn’t simply sit quietly and say nothing about a crank being allowed to teach physics courses, nor attend conferences or journals that treated them as respectable researchers. Moreover, were they to do so the progress of the discipline, and certainly the public understanding of physics, would be greatly harmed. My point is ultimately that it’s not enough for analytic philosophers (particularly tenured ones) to sit back and privately dismiss all this crap as rubbish. They have a positive duty to denounce these people as cranks and eliminate them from the field. Failing that they have a duty, even if it imperils funding, to demand departments be split and otherwise clearly distingush what they do from what the continental crankpots do.

To be clear not everyone one might classify as a ‘continental philosopher’ should be deemed a crank. Despite being notoriously confusing Kant surely is not. Mere error or poor writing is not enough to be a crank. However, neither the blurriness of the line or our inclinations to charity are an excuse for tolerating obviously incoherent gibberish as valid philosophy. Since it’s notoriously difficult to conclusively establish that some convoluted continental style ‘argument’ lacks any reasonable interpretation the burden should be on the person presenting the apparent gibberish to convince others they are merely really poor writers with a meaningful point.

So if you’ve listened to NPR or read a newspaper during the past year you’ve probably heard someone bemoaning the incipient failure of the newspaper industry. Today I was stunned to find an article on slashdot describing the attempts of newspapers to (more or less) collude to implement paywalls. The thinking at the newspapers seems to be that somehow the evil internet is causing a perfectly efficient well run industry to hemorrhage money by letting their customers recieve their product for too little.

Seems to me that this is the result of biased thinking from an industry reluctant to change. The internet is an amazing tool that radically increases the efficency of news delivery but increases in efficiency are always painful. Just like the printing press before it the increased efficency offered by digital delivery is going to put some people out of work.

Far from being an efficent industry when I look at the newspaper business I see an unimaginable amount of waste. The most obvious form of waste is physical printing and delivery. The overhead of running a printing press every night and distributing the paper plus the indirect costs this incurs is huge. However, even ignoring this I’m constantly amazed at the amount of duplicated effort between newspapers. The need for local physical printing has let each newspaper to employ their own movie reviewers, editors etc.. etc.. Heck, having 20+ reporters at a press conference doesn’t help journalism it just wastes money.

It’s going to be painful for newspapers. Many journalists may lose their jobs. Local papers may be reduced to merely local news but there is an awful lot of efficiency that can be gained without sacrificing any investigative journalism.

Does anyone really take this kind of article purporting to analyze why women often conflict with other women in the workplace to be a serious attempt to discern the truth? I know one can’t go very deep in 3 pages but it seems totally transparent to me that the author choose to tell an alarming then comforting sequence of little myths rather than engage in even the most cursory analysis of the issue. Sure, this is low hanging fruit as far as bad arguments go but this article managed to combine thoughtless emotional sloganism about gender interaction with total disregard for the truth and used them as a vehicle to foist her traditional stereotypes about the need for women to be nurturing and supportive on the reader. Frankly it’s one of the most sexist things I’ve ever read on the internet.

The article begins inauspisciously by hanging the whole premise of the article on a blatant fallacy. Do women preferentially bully other women? I don’t know but the study quoted in the article sure as hell doesn’t say so. What it actually says is that women report being bullied by women and men about equally often, and at about the same rate as men report being bullied by men but men report being bullied by women much less. Of course, this is exactly what one would expect to see if men were simply reluctant to admit being bullied by women. So the entire effect could be nothing more then men feeling embarrassed to admit being bullied by a woman.

As if to further refute her own hypothesis the author then informs us that women are taught they should be supporting and nurturing to each other so they feel bad treatment from other women particularly disturbing. But, hmm, wouldn’t that suggest that women are holding women up to a higher standard? Of course the author doesn’t seem to realize this would inflate the women on women bullying numbers nor that, this expectation itself might cause women to retaliate against each other for perceived failures to live up to this higher standard.

After pointlessly observing she knows some women who feel they are bullied more by women the author suddenly jumps tracks to ask why women are less likely to be perceived as leaders. Drawing up the dark cloud of discriminatory/unfair treatment she tells us that women are perceived negatively if they behave as aggressively as the men but can’t get promoted if they don’t. That, indeed, is a worthwhile question to ask but instead we get a heartwarming story about a group of female executives getting together to role-play scenarios and help them discover their political blind spots.

I’m sure that plays well to the majority of readers who (as I often am myself) are more interested in the emotional journey than thinking hard about the right answer but it should also set off a giant flashing red “DANGER” sign in anyone who has been paying attention. I mean at least skip a paragraph or two after observing how unfair it is that women can’t display the aggression men do before telling them you expect them to be more supporting and cooperative. I mean she might as well have suggested women get together every month to bake and let each other know if any of the guys aren’t getting enough of their cooking. Besides, if you are worried, as the author is, about women picking on each other because they see themselves as competing for the same female slots in the cooperation you might want to hesitate before encouraging women to see themselves as female employees. Indeed, the results on stereotype threat would seem to suggest that thinking of themselves as women encourages them to behave more like the traditional gender stereotype. So no, it may not be necessary or desirable for women to be “aware of their shared identity as women.”

As if to make sure she hammered home the point that women had better be cooperative and supportive as their gender dictates the author approvingly includes this view before the end of the article.

Televerde reversed that attitude in Perryville, Ms. Cirocco said, by encouraging women to work for a common cause, much like the environment envisioned by the Canadian researchers. “It becomes a very nurturing environment,” Ms. Cirocco said. “You have all these women who become your friends, and you are personally invested in their success. Everyone wants everyone to get out, to go on to have a good healthy life.” If the level of support found at Televerde were found elsewhere, Ms. Klaus said, it would solve a lot of problems.

I mean this stuff is right up there with (actually far worse since it’s more respectable) the worst of the perversions of evolutionary psychology used to assure the author they were inferior. It masquerades as science and analysis despite lacking anything of the kind while using hackneyed emotional ploys to convince the reader that women need to try even harder to play their traditional supportive and nurturing gender role and worst of all do so subtly enough to be reasonably successful. If people aren’t going to get outrage by this sort of piece they should stop pretending they are fighting gender stereotypes and want to move beyond traditional gender roles and just admit it’s just all about group pride. If your really worried about the culture pushing gender stereotypes onto women here you go. Outrage over this kind of article might actually accomplish something. So if you aren’t going to make a big deal about this kind of article just drop the pose. It’s in the New York Times for crying out loud.

So lately I’ve been reading a bit of Overcoming Bias and Less Wrong. While the posts on these sites are always interesting they frequently, especially at Less Wrong, seem to promote a sort of cult of rationality. Of course I too value reaching the right conclusions instead of the wrong ones and am broadly sympathetic with the goal of ameliorating the negative effects of psychological shortcuts that interfere with our utility but alot of the content on these sites seems to go much further than this. For example consider these posts by Robin Hanson and Eliezer Yudkowsky. Underlying these remarks seems to be the assumption that there is some kind of objective standard of (perfect?) rationality to which we could aspire that would somehow capture our intuitive notion of rationality as distinct from merely being lucky. While I rarely see rationality so earnestly venerated as it is on these two sites the same assumption pervades much of analytic philosophy and many puzzles and papers simply take it for granted that there is some well defined notion of rational thinking/belief(I’ll leave act rationality out of this for the moment). However, despite being an extremely useful tool in describing common situations and deciscions it’s long been my view that, when considered in full generality, rationality isn’t even a coherent concept.

To explain what I mean we first need to go back to Quine’s seminal paper Two Dogma’s of Empiricism. Even though I think Carnap clearly had the better of the argument about analyticity¹ I want to give Quine credit for pointing out to me the way in which the concepts we use depend on our background assumptions (how we model/conceptualize things) for their very coherence. Just as the concept of an equivalence class stops making sense once you start talking about non-transitive relations so too do many of our scientific and everyday notions cease to be well defined when we no longer accept the assumptions they were defined with respect to.

Stealing an example from Quine consider the Newtonian concept of kinetic energy. A good Newtonian physicist would have said that the kinetic energy is defined to be .5mv² where m is the object’s mass and v it’s velocity. However, kinetic energy is obviously also intended to be in some sense a measure of the work it would take to stop that object. Since these two notions coincide on the Newtonian picture there isn’t any problem. So long as we believe (or even use as an approximation) Newtonian physics there isn’t any question as to which is the right definition of kinetic energy. We are simultaneously committed to the concept capturing both notions. What Quine observed is that once we abandon the Newtonian conceptual framework there isn’t really any objective fact about which commitments we should honor and which we should discard. If scientists had responded to special relativity by using kinetic energy to describe the Newtonian formula and started theorizing about the conservation of Eisensteinian smenergy we couldn’t really accuse them of having made a mistake. Just as there is no right way to extend the notion of an equivalence class to non-transitive relations there often isn’t any right way to extend our scientific or everyday concepts outside of the frameworks they were conceived in.

The upshot of all this, in my view, is that our most useful concepts often presuppose certain assumptions. When these assumptions no longer hold the concepts themselves may cease to be coherent. So keeping this in mind let’s take a look at the assumptions that give rise to our concept of rationality.

Without going into too much detail I think it’s fairly safe to assume that a major (primary?) grip on (belief) rationality comes by way of postulating that people hold various beliefs where we take those beliefs to behave in some loose way like propositions. In other words we gloss over complexities like the effect of context and social situation on the views people express and simply pretend they either do or don’t believe some claim. Of course you can embelish this view a great deal and allow people to believe things in varying degrees or even take them to merely have some transitive implication relation. However, we can only stretch these concepts so far before they become unwieldy and useless, something we all implicitly recognize when we hesitate to attribute beliefs to ethnic groups, countries, or our computers.

So what? It’s hardly news that some aspects of people’s behavior won’t be well described by idealizing them as having something like beliefs. However, the point I want to press home is that rationality isn’t a property that big fleshy globs of atoms have. Rationality, is a concept grasped in terms of a certain kind of idealization about human behavior. It’s a useful concept and useful idealization but it’s still a type error to think of it as a property that applies to actual physical beings. We frequently forget this because in most contexts there is an obvious “right” way to idealize someone as an agent with certain beliefs so we talk about people having irrational beliefs and find it useful. However, it’s important to remember this shorthand only makes sense as long as this kind of idealization makes for a decent model of human behavior. Just like it’s simply confused to talk about the Newtonian kinetic energy of a particle traveling at .999c there are situations in which idealizing people as having something like belief is such a bad way to model their behavior that talking about rationality is similarly confused.

But the situation for a viewpoint independent concept of rationality applicable to real people only gets worse once you realize just how sensitive the ascription of rationality is to the way we choose to idealize the situation. Choosing to idealize a split brain patient as a single agent will yield very different judgments about his degree of rationality than idealizing his actions as the result of two seperate agents with distinct beliefs. It’s not that one of these idealizations is wrong and the other right (what could that even mean?) but just that in certain contexts one will be more useful than the other. And it’s not just split brain patients, Frued and many others have often taught that people were better modeled as the result of several competing agents or personalities. To really drive home the dependence of ascriptions of rationality on your choice of model just try to work out how you could make a principled application of the concept to a network of partial autonomous, partially integrated AIs.

My point is that it’s not just that we can’t ever be fully rational. It’s that the very notion as applied to living breathing people isn’t even coherent. Rationality is a concept that lives in an abstract idealize realm populate by agents possesing something like beliefs. It’s only applicable to real creatures insofar as this kind of idealization is useful and people largely agree on how it should be done. Step beyond that and it just doesn’t make sense anyone. I also think this realization can help alleviate some of the confusion over various paradoxes like the surprise quiz but that’s another post.

So I was pretty upset about the ridiculous idiotic populist outrage over the AIG bonuses. The last week of media coverage has only made me more angry as I listened to pundit after pundit, even those few who argued for leaving the bonuses alone, panderingly assure the public that their outrage over the bonuses was perfectly justified. Should the government have used the depressed job market to reduce AIG employee compensation of all forms when they took over? Maybe, but that doesn’t justify the outrage at paying the bonuses. Of course it’s understandable that this scandal made people so angry, the word bonuses triggers certain associations and people form a mental picture of people being patted on the back for the immoral behavior that has caused them harm. It’s the role of the media to remind us that the issue is more complex than this, that these bonuses aren’t rewards for performance but basically just another form of salary and to point out that most of the people working for AIG’s financial products division were probably perfectly moral people behaving no differently than they would have in the same situation. The media’s craven failure to offer this opposing perspective is particularly aggravating.

Still, if this amounted to nothing more than a national venting no big deal. The extent to which this seems to be motivated by a desire to see others suffer as they are would still be disgusting but that’s a sad part of human nature. Horrifyingly, however, congress really seems to be going through with this plan to levy a 70-90% tax on bonus payments to AIG employees. This law will be subject to constitutional challenge as a bill of attainder (meaning the taxpayers might get to pay for the bonuses and the lawsuits) but even if it fails to meet the constitutional qualifications to be struck down in such a fashion it surely violates the spirit of the prohibition on bills of attainder.

I mean it doesn’t take a genius to figure out that the primary motivation here isn’t to save money or raise revenue for the government. If those were the motivations we would at a minimum be broadly taxing compensation at AIG. No, the public is angry at these people and wants to punish¹ them. But even if you think these people deserve to be punished the principal that we don’t punish individuals based merely on public anger is an important one. If this sort of thing passes muster there really is no way to say that taxing the principal of Bill Gate’s investments at 99% because we are pissed about the shody programming in windows is out of bounds or just because we don’t like the way he treated his wife. Ultimately when it comes to this question we have to set aside all consideration of it being taxpayer money or the unfairness of the situation. The government here isn’t acting as an investor in AIG but as the soverign. Nor does it make a difference that these bonuses haven’t been paid yet and that Bill Gates already has his money. Gates doesn’t keep a giant wad of cash in his house, he is content to let banks owe him the money just as AIG owes their employees their bonuses.

And for the love of god what could possibly motivate people to engage in this sort of dangerous punitive action when they don’t even know how most of the people who are receiving the bonuses behaved?