In my last post I criticized ElBaradei for suggesting that we ought to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. A friend of mine brought it to my attention that my post could be read to mischaracterize ElBaradei as some simple minded Berkeley hippie who thinks all countries should immediately disarm. I only sought to criticize ElBaradei for his apparently uncritical acceptance of total nuclear disarmament as the ideal we should strive for sometime in the imaginable future, i.e., before the existence of a stable worldwide government. However, reading more about his speech and the statements of the Director General on the IAEA web site it seems like he isn’t that far from it. Sure he doesn’t think everyone should dismantle their weapons tomorrow, and he believes in taking care the transition doesn’t trigger instability, but, he clearly thinks all nuclear weapons should be eliminated sometime in the foreseeable future, probably during many adults lifetime. After I establish that ElBaradei seeks to eliminate nuclear weapons before world power structure is fundamentally changed, i.e., while the world is comprised of armed nation states, I will explain why this is a bad idea and sketch out benefits of hesitating just shy of total disarmament (allowing nations to retain a few weapons in a dismantled state). His support of the CTBT (the dangers of which I already detailed) doesn’t increase my estimation of him either.

In his personal statement on the IAEA website ElBaradei says the following:

First, accelerated and tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament. As the United Nations Secretary-General recently stated, “what is needed is a truly two-track approach — one that does not continually ‘save’ disarmament for later, but treats disarmament and non-proliferation as closely related challenges.” The “unequivocal commitment” by the nuclear weapons States during the NPT Review Conference to “accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” is certainly a sign of hope. But this commitment will have to be translated soon into concrete steps to gain credibility.

While not giving a specific time this excerpt, like the rest of his statement, strongly suggests he is talking about a matter of decades not centuries. Moreover, as the same sort of time frame is described in the linked description of his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech we can be confident he is presenting this as his view not (merely) the professional position of the IAEA. This interpretation is further supported by ElBaradei’s positive comparison of the total ban on chemical weapons with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, his supposed mechanism is not some threat of swift and extreme military punishment to so deter nuclear proliferation that even the lure of being the only nuclear power won’t tempt them. Rather here is what he proposes to replace nuclear deterrence with:

Second, and in parallel, the development of an alternative system of collective security that does not depend on nuclear deterrence. Security through economic and social development, good governance, respect for human rights, and an agreed process for the peaceful settlement of disputes is ultimately the best disincentive to acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

In fact in a Jerusalem Post interview ElBaradei said, “You cannot use force to prevent a country from obtaining nuclear weapons. By bombing them half to death, you can only delay the plans.” Apparently ElBaradei may not believe in the use of force to deter proliferation at all. Now of course it is entirely possible ElBaradei is engaging in deliberate diplomatic deception, or at least misdirection, to encourage continued participation in the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty) by non-nuclear states and to avoid potential fall out from an Israeli strike on Iran. If so I congratulate Mr. ElBaradei for executing this strategy but I think it’s highly probable he really does believe in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the next several decades.

Instead of totally eliminating nuclear weapons like ElBaradei proposes I instead support nominating a few ’safe-keeping’ nations who would keep a few dozen nuclear weapons in a dismantled state. In the event that some nation rearms these safekeeping nations would have the responsibility of deterring any nuclear strike. If these safe-keeping nations were chosen in some fair manner based on criteria of stability and willingness to execute their responsibility this approach would capture most of the advantages of disarmament while avoiding its pitfalls. Below I will detail the dangers of complete disarmament and the advantages of this plan. The essential problem with this idealistic goal is the sheer military power of nuclear weapons. Any lone nuclear power willing to use its weapons could demand pretty much whatever it wanted. Even now countries are willing to risk invasion or military strikes to just be one of many nuclear countries. The prospect of being the lone nuclear power would be just too much for many countries to resist, certainly if it is only international disapproval that they will face. Despite the lack of the huge military advantage provided by nuclear weapons genocide still seems to keep happening despite international moral disapproval (though not action) which is about as strong as one can get. So long as many countries still view military might as desirable and its use a live option, i.e., we don’t have world peace, the idea that international pressure would deter proliferation is implausible.

Certainly the present international system is in no shape to pressure a country not to develop a nuclear weapon. We couldn’t even make Iraq open up to inspections before an army was sitting on his doorstep and they didn’t even have any nuclear weapons to hide. Perhaps in the future we will have a more effective sanctions system but even still without military punishment it is quite likely countries would be willing to simply endure censure for the time it took to make their nukes. The United States went from nothing a a nuclear weapon in 5 years and the march of technology and the dissemination of knowledge will only continue to shorten this time. Once a nuclear power they use this power to occupy whatever territory they desire and offer to dismantle their arsenal in return for the elimination of whatever sanctions of punishments the international community have inflicted. If the international community is not willing to resort to force they really have no choice but to accept this offer. They have no other leverage to get the rogue state to give up its weapon and if they stay nuclear the whole system collapses.

If we suppose the international community is prepared to use force either as a punishment/deterant or as a means to destroy active nuclear weapon programs then the outlook may be a bit better, though countries with superior classical forces would likely be immune from such punishment. Perhaps a much strengthened system of inspections make the cost/benefit analysis come out negative for any country thinking of going nuclear, though this would require a willingness to punish countries that merely kick out inspectors or hide activities rather than waiting for proof. However, one must expect that some leaders won’t be entirely rational. Moreover, it is doubtful that we could ever have a regime of inspections reliable enough we could count on discovering any weapons research before it produces a weapon.

While a much better funded IAEA might be able to enforce the NPT to this degree the whole game changes when you have to stop some of the richest most technologically advanced countries in the world from recreating their nuclear capability. Additionally every year technological advancement makes creating nuclear weapons that much easier. While I believe ElBaradei’s approach is to do an end run around the worry of detection by strictly controlling any nuclear materials that might be used to create a bomb this promises to be quite difficult. It is one thing to stop countries with limited nuclear know-how from getting access to enriched uranium, plutonium or reactors/reactor fuel which might be used to create them. It is entirely another thing when trying to prevent countries like the US, China or Russia who have plenty of experience may have scientific knowledge in this area the IAEA lacks from secretly re-arming. It seems entirely possible that a sophisticated country could assemble triggering devices for hydrogen bombs from non-standard and unmonitored (old waste) fissile material. Finally, of course, the biggest danger with this system is that it is totally dependent on the efficacy of an UN agency. Future corruption, incompetence or funding cuts would all gravely imperil this scheme.

Additionally there is always the very real possibility that the nuclear powers haven’t been totally forthcoming with the size of their nuclear arsenals and would retain a few hidden weapons. Of course if we are willing to trust the major world powers not to hide weapons, surreptitiously rearm themselves or give other countries aid in developing nukes then I think, backed up by force, such a system might be able to work. However, if we are going to trust the world powers why not trust a few safe-keeping nations to keep a small reserve/deterrent arsenal in a disassembled form? This would actually result in a smaller risk of nuclear conflict because it doesn’t dramatically increase the benefits of going nuclear the way total disarmament does. Nor does it risk accidental war where two supposedly non-nuclear countries mistakenly escalate their dispute into a full blown nuclear conflict thinking their for doesn’t have nukes. Most importantly one country who breaks the rules would not unravel the entire arms control regime if a few reserve weapons are kept the way it would if we had total disarmament. If a single country develops nukes (or is even suspected of making nukes) in a totally disarmed world other nations will have no choice but to develop their own weapons. However, if one of the nations anointed for nuclear safekeeping could instead step in and guarantee to respond in kind to any first strike proliferation does not need to snowball.

Of course the selection of the safe-keeping nations is absolutely critical. While on a purely apolitical perspective the best choice might be the nuclear powers since we are effectively trusting them anyway this risks alienating the non-nuclear countries from the non-proliferation agreements. By making sure all countries are considered for this role based on the same criteria the fairness based appeal of total disarmament could be had without the risks. Additionally it is important that they represent a diverse collection of countries so every unarmed state can be confident some safe-keeping nation is not so antagonistic to them that they won’t fulfill their deterrence function on their behalf.

Finally we come to the critical question. Would allowing these countries to keep weapons, even in dismantled form, present too much of a risk of nuclear war? I think not, at least if this scheme was going to work in the first place. If we create such a strong sense of disapproval of nuclear weapons no country would develop them this same effect should prevent the safe-keeping countries from using the weapons. Moreover, since the weapons are held in trust they would not necessarily be viewed as part of a country’s military defense. In fact they should probably be specifically prohibited from being under military control. Ultimately if the most stable and responsible countries we can select cannot avoid deploying nuclear weapons despite the possibility the other safe-keeping nations would respond in kind I don’t see there being much hope of lasting worldwide disarmament.

Total disarmament makes for a nice sounding ideal, and in the very long run it is desirable. Once an effective world government exists or the thought of a war between nations is as absurd as that of a war between California and Oregon we can finally remove this radioactive sword of Damocles from the world but until then it seems to create more risk than averts.