Just as I feared the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case is eroding our first amendment rights in other areas. I’m stunned to see the effect so quickly but I’m not surprised, only horrified, by the ruling in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District. Follow the link for a very nice description from Decision of the Day but I’ll give a quick summary for the lazy.

Aaron Wisniewski, an eigth grade student, made a crude drawing of a teacher at his school getting shot and used it as his AOL IM icon for three weeks. Eventually another classmate snitched on him and the school suspended Aaron. The police and a school psychologist then talked with Aaron and concluded the drawing had been meant as a joke and he didn’t pose any threat. Despite this conclusion a superintendent’s hearing concluded the drawing should not have been regarded as a joke and proposed a long term suspension for Aaron which was approved. Aaron’s parents then sued claiming that “the school board acted in a retaliatory manner in violation of Aaron’s free speech rights.” (from the deciscion) It is important to note that all of the communication took place outside of school but that the superintendent’s hearing choose to punish Aaron anyway because his speech violated school rules and required time and attention from the school.

Disturbingly the district court apparently made it’s own determination that Aaron’s speech was reasonably understood as a constitutionally unprotected true threat, an obviously absurd conclusion¹. Now the appeals court avoided the issue of whether Aaron’s speech truly rose to this level but it seems to imply that it does not. In either case we can assume, arguendo, that it does not as we consider the central holding of the appeals court:

Even if Aaron’s transmission of an icon depicting and calling for the killing of his teacher could be viewed as an expression of opinion within the meaning of Tinker, we conclude that it crosses the boundary of protected speech and constitutes student conduct that poses a reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities and that it would “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”

Just by itself this decision is greatly troubling in several ways:

1. Like Morse the decision seems to ignore the distinction between harm or disruption that results from the form of the expression (acting out during class) and that which results from the content expressed. A notion of free speech that allows the government to punish your speech if it makes people so mad they create a disruption or provokes them to a harmful response isn’t free speech at all. To modify a frequent example from the Volokh Conspiracy if a majority of the population wanted to ban pro-gay speech in schools all they would need to do is protest such speech so vehemently that it constituted a disruption of the school environment.². Importantly the deciscion doesn’t even seem to require that the school prove that the disruption was a based on a reasonable prediction³ of Aaron’s future violence.

2. Imposing this punishment accomplishes nothing particularly relevant to student discipline. Certainly the school has an interest in avoiding the trouble and expense of dealing with situations people (irrationally) think are threatening⁴ but they have the same interest whether Aaron was a student or a member of the general public. If the government’s interest in avoiding this sort of bother is enough to justify detering it in Aaron’s case why isn’t it enough to justify fining a student’s father, or brother, or friend who creates a similar drawing knowing it may get back to the school and cause similar effects.

3. The decision permits punishment of speech that took place outside of school and was never intended to make it back to the school. The court was divided on whether it was necessary that it was “reasonably foreseeable that Aaron’s IM icon would reach the school property” or “the undisputed fact that it did reach the school” is enough. In either case it apparently doesn’t matter how the speech will reach the school. This means that so long as those who find the speech distasteful are sufficiently fastidious about bringing any student statements back onto the school campus the student can be denied any means to publicly express the idea without fear of government retaliation.

However, bad appellate decisions are troubling but nothing new. What is even more worrisome is the way this deciscion shows that, as I feared, the reasoning in Morse v. Fredrick is being extended beyond student advocacy of illegal drug use. The simple timing of this opinion suggests that the appeals court may have been waiting for Morse to be decided to get a sense of which way the supreme court was leaning. Additionally the decision troublingly cites Morse v. Fredrick several times, both as an authority to limit the holding in Tinker and to justify the incoherent distinction between this sort of speech and “conduct that was merely ‘offensive,’ … or merely in conflict with some view of the school’s ‘educational mission.’”

Just as I feared you can’t undermine free speech rights just for the topic or situation you find particularly objectionable and hope that it won’t erode free speech more generally.