Frequently evidence for the corrupting influence is overstated by the supporters of campaign finance reform. For example assuming that the correlation between campaign expenditures and victory represents a causal relationship like this blog post over at change-congress.org does. Indeed, one would expect that generally the more appealing candidate would garner more donations as would the front runner¹. Still, only an idiot would believe that money spent on lobbyists and campaign contributions doesn’t buy any influence. After all why would companies spend this money if it didn’t increase the chances of regulations favorable to their interests? This extra influence purchased by corporations and the wealthy surely helps create inefficient policies and bad laws. Thus it’s not surprising that so many people, from internet trolls to very smart men like Lawrence Lessig, believe that effective campaign finance reform will radically improve the quality of government. However, I would argue that this apparent legislative paradise is merely a mirage. Trying to eliminate the problem of unequal access is necessarily a game of whack-a-mole. The more stringently we regulate one type of political pandering (such as for campaign contributions) the worse we make another type of political pandering.

This isn’t to say that none of Lessig’s (unoriginal) ideas are worthwhile. I think public funding of elections might be a good way to reduce the incumbent advantage, combat mistrust in the system and encourage a more diverse set of candidates to run². Of course the public is never likely to support the relatively large (though still small compared to the federal budget) sums required for public financing to drown out the effects of wealthy candidates or third party ads run without coordination with the campaign³. However, the belief that even a perfectly implemented public financing system would eliminate the problems of undue influence is misguided. All it would do is change the currency.

If both candidates are given the same amount of funds then aspiring office holders will simply scramble for some other kind of advantage. Likely free channels to distribute their message or celebrities to draw extra attention. If both candidates can but equivalent amounts of airtime maybe they will scramble to get the most respected celebrities to appear in advertisements to make them more effective. Maybe instead they will scramble to kiss ass to the party elite to purchase political endorsements or to union leaders to mobilize campaign workers and distribute their message. Or maybe it will be elite society so more doors are opened for them. In any case it’s simply not plausible to assume that there won’t be some group of people who are far more able to benefit the campaign than others. These people will be courted for the slight advantage they can provide. Ultimately only one person can win the election and equalizing the candidates along one dimension will simply make them compete all the more fiercly for advantage along some other dimension. At least monetary contributions have the advantage of being openly published and being available to anyone with money. That’s a lot better than many ways influence could be distributed.

Even if you imagined a world where candidates felt no need to court any power brokers to be elected it’s hard to imagine that we still wouldn’t see all the harms associated with lobbyists. Legislators often need to be informed about issues and it’s effect on industry so it would be disastrous (and likely unconstitutional) to simply ban them from interacting with industry insiders. Unfortunately there is often no other group organized enough to realize that legislation was upcoming and provide their own knowledgeable polished expert to present their case to lawmakers. Transparency and neutral government experts can help but they can’t solve the problem. Banning lobbyists or lobbying couldn’t stop companies from purchasing influence. It could only drive it underground.

Legislators have to seek advice and information somewhere and money will always enable one to make sure that it’s easier and more convenient to learn about their side of the argument. Nothing can stop corporations from establishing branches in DC and ensuring that the executives employed therein are persuasive advocates for their cause who travel in the same social circle as legislators. You can’t bar the friends and relatives of legislators from working nor from sharing their views with the legislator over Christmas dinner or at the bar. All a ban on lobbyists would accomplish is to transform a transparent, widely accessible and regulated means of purchasing influence into a complex, totally opaque system of purchasing influence that also favors established companies and interests over new players. At least now a upstart like google can hire their own lobbyists on day 1 and compete with the entrenched interests rather than suffering from unfavorable regulation for years while they learned the unwritten rules and hired the friends and families of politicians slowly enough not to draw attention to what they were doing.

In short, the open influence of money in politics may be bad but it’s not at all clear the alternatives are any better. At the very least the existence of lobbyists and campaign contributions prevents the creation of an entrenched political elite who perpetuate their power and influence by making sure they know the right people and attend the right parties. I’d much rather have a system where anyone of any background who makes it big or builds an organization of like-minded donors can purchase access than one in which unwritten rules and social status reserve influence to the established elite.