<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Rational Incoherence</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/2009/05/10/rational-incoherence/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/2009/05/10/rational-incoherence/</link>
	<description>Good Analysis, Bad Grammar</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Jul 2010 11:11:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.1</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: Anika Eckhart</title>
		<link>http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/2009/05/10/rational-incoherence/comment-page-1/#comment-14931</link>
		<dc:creator>Anika Eckhart</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2010 14:49:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/?p=533#comment-14931</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Thanks for posting this great information :)&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for posting this great information :)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Eliezer Yudkowsky</title>
		<link>http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/2009/05/10/rational-incoherence/comment-page-1/#comment-9080</link>
		<dc:creator>Eliezer Yudkowsky</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2009 19:32:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/?p=533#comment-9080</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;When Less Wrong &lt;a href=&quot;http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Rationality&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;says &quot;rationality&quot;&lt;/a&gt;, we mean epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality: obtaining a certain sort of correspondence between a map and the territory (&quot;truth&quot;), and choosing so as to steer the future toward regions we value highly (&quot;winning&quot;).  To formalize the former we have probability theory, for the latter decision theory.  Of course there are many sorts of human behavior that aren&#039;t easily described in these terms.  But why does that say that we can&#039;t have a coherent discussion about truth-finding or winning strategies?  People who mouth certain words because they&#039;re socially expected to do so may not be coherently analyzable as having beliefs, but that&#039;s because they&#039;re not looking for truth.  They could be called irrational or arational, but not rational.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Less Wrong <a href="http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Rationality" rel="nofollow">says &#8220;rationality&#8221;</a>, we mean epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality: obtaining a certain sort of correspondence between a map and the territory (&#8220;truth&#8221;), and choosing so as to steer the future toward regions we value highly (&#8220;winning&#8221;).  To formalize the former we have probability theory, for the latter decision theory.  Of course there are many sorts of human behavior that aren&#8217;t easily described in these terms.  But why does that say that we can&#8217;t have a coherent discussion about truth-finding or winning strategies?  People who mouth certain words because they&#8217;re socially expected to do so may not be coherently analyzable as having beliefs, but that&#8217;s because they&#8217;re not looking for truth.  They could be called irrational or arational, but not rational.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Robin Hanson</title>
		<link>http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/2009/05/10/rational-incoherence/comment-page-1/#comment-5456</link>
		<dc:creator>Robin Hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2009 11:00:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.infiniteinjury.org/blog/?p=533#comment-5456</guid>
		<description>&lt;p&gt;Can&#039;t we sensibly aspire to the goal of moving our beliefs closer to the truth, and to better distinguishing which of our apparent beliefs are actually epistemic-type beliefs?&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can&#8217;t we sensibly aspire to the goal of moving our beliefs closer to the truth, and to better distinguishing which of our apparent beliefs are actually epistemic-type beliefs?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
