In my last post I criticized ElBaradei for suggesting that we ought to completely eliminate nuclear weapons. A friend of mine brought it to my attention that my post could be read to mischaracterize ElBaradei as some simple minded Berkeley hippie who thinks all countries should immediately disarm. I only sought to criticize ElBaradei for his apparently uncritical acceptance of total nuclear disarmament as the ideal we should strive for sometime in the imaginable future, i.e., before the existence of a stable worldwide government. However, reading more about his speech and the statements of the Director General on the IAEA web site it seems like he isn’t that far from it. Sure he doesn’t think everyone should dismantle their weapons tomorrow, and he believes in taking care the transition doesn’t trigger instability, but, he clearly thinks all nuclear weapons should be eliminated sometime in the foreseeable future, probably during many adults lifetime. After I establish that ElBaradei seeks to eliminate nuclear weapons before world power structure is fundamentally changed, i.e., while the world is comprised of armed nation states, I will explain why this is a bad idea and sketch out benefits of hesitating just shy of total disarmament (allowing nations to retain a few weapons in a dismantled state). His support of the CTBT (the dangers of which I already detailed) doesn’t increase my estimation of him either.

In his personal statement on the IAEA website ElBaradei says the following:

First, accelerated and tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament. As the United Nations Secretary-General recently stated, “what is needed is a truly two-track approach — one that does not continually ‘save’ disarmament for later, but treats disarmament and non-proliferation as closely related challenges.” The “unequivocal commitment” by the nuclear weapons States during the NPT Review Conference to “accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” is certainly a sign of hope. But this commitment will have to be translated soon into concrete steps to gain credibility.

While not giving a specific time this excerpt, like the rest of his statement, strongly suggests he is talking about a matter of decades not centuries. Moreover, as the same sort of time frame is described in the linked description of his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech we can be confident he is presenting this as his view not (merely) the professional position of the IAEA. This interpretation is further supported by ElBaradei’s positive comparison of the total ban on chemical weapons with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, his supposed mechanism is not some threat of swift and extreme military punishment to so deter nuclear proliferation that even the lure of being the only nuclear power won’t tempt them. Rather here is what he proposes to replace nuclear deterrence with:

Second, and in parallel, the development of an alternative system of collective security that does not depend on nuclear deterrence. Security through economic and social development, good governance, respect for human rights, and an agreed process for the peaceful settlement of disputes is ultimately the best disincentive to acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

In fact in a Jerusalem Post interview ElBaradei said, “You cannot use force to prevent a country from obtaining nuclear weapons. By bombing them half to death, you can only delay the plans.” Apparently ElBaradei may not believe in the use of force to deter proliferation at all. Now of course it is entirely possible ElBaradei is engaging in deliberate diplomatic deception, or at least misdirection, to encourage continued participation in the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty) by non-nuclear states and to avoid potential fall out from an Israeli strike on Iran. If so I congratulate Mr. ElBaradei for executing this strategy but I think it’s highly probable he really does believe in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the next several decades.

Instead of totally eliminating nuclear weapons like ElBaradei proposes I instead support nominating a few ’safe-keeping’ nations who would keep a few dozen nuclear weapons in a dismantled state. In the event that some nation rearms these safekeeping nations would have the responsibility of deterring any nuclear strike. If these safe-keeping nations were chosen in some fair manner based on criteria of stability and willingness to execute their responsibility this approach would capture most of the advantages of disarmament while avoiding its pitfalls. Below I will detail the dangers of complete disarmament and the advantages of this plan. (more…)

Unfortunately much of the debate about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has focused on weather or not the US needs nuclear tests to maintain its nuclear arsenal or even expand it. This has pushed aside the important question of how the CTBT might increase or decrease risk of a nuclear conflict and replaced it with an ideological battle over whether the US should maintain a muscular military stance backed by nuclear weapons. Others even seem to view the CTBT as some kind of referendum on nuclear weapons. While I fully agree that nuclear weapons are an unfortunate development and that the US should retreat to a much reduced nuclear arsenal (enough to retain deterrence) these political questions should not distract us from the real implications of the CTBT.

In fact far from reducing the risk of nuclear conflict I think the CTBT actually increases this risk. The CTBT does little over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to further discourage proliferation. What it does do is increase the uncertainty over a countries nuclear arsenal and its effectiveness. As a quick game-theoretic style consideration reveals countries with only a 50/50 chance of having working nuclear weapons may in fact be far more dangerous than those countries with known nuclear capability. While one might think important concerns like this would be addressed by proponents of the CTBT but even relatively reputable advocates seem to have been distracted by the ideological battle. I will walk through the arguments below but ultimately I think it is a very bad idea to risk a greater likelihood of nuclear conflict just to make a statement. (more…)