In his personal statement on the IAEA website ElBaradei says the following:

First, accelerated and tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament. As the United Nations Secretary-General recently stated, “what is needed is a truly two-track approach — one that does not continually ‘save’ disarmament for later, but treats disarmament and non-proliferation as closely related challenges.” The “unequivocal commitment” by the nuclear weapons States during the NPT Review Conference to “accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” is certainly a sign of hope. But this commitment will have to be translated soon into concrete steps to gain credibility.

While not giving a specific time this excerpt, like the rest of his statement, strongly suggests he is talking about a matter of decades not centuries. Moreover, as the same sort of time frame is described in the linked description of his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech we can be confident he is presenting this as his view not (merely) the professional position of the IAEA. This interpretation is further supported by ElBaradei’s positive comparison of the total ban on chemical weapons with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, his supposed mechanism is not some threat of swift and extreme military punishment to so deter nuclear proliferation that even the lure of being the only nuclear power won’t tempt them. Rather here is what he proposes to replace nuclear deterrence with:

Second, and in parallel, the development of an alternative system of collective security that does not depend on nuclear deterrence. Security through economic and social development, good governance, respect for human rights, and an agreed process for the peaceful settlement of disputes is ultimately the best disincentive to acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

In fact in a Jerusalem Post interview ElBaradei said, “You cannot use force to prevent a country from obtaining nuclear weapons. By bombing them half to death, you can only delay the plans.” Apparently ElBaradei may not believe in the use of force to deter proliferation at all. Now of course it is entirely possible ElBaradei is engaging in deliberate diplomatic deception, or at least misdirection, to encourage continued participation in the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation treaty) by non-nuclear states and to avoid potential fall out from an Israeli strike on Iran. If so I congratulate Mr. ElBaradei for executing this strategy but I think it’s highly probable he really does believe in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the next several decades.

Instead of totally eliminating nuclear weapons like ElBaradei proposes I instead support nominating a few ’safe-keeping’ nations who would keep a few dozen nuclear weapons in a dismantled state. In the event that some nation rearms these safekeeping nations would have the responsibility of deterring any nuclear strike. If these safe-keeping nations were chosen in some fair manner based on criteria of stability and willingness to execute their responsibility this approach would capture most of the advantages of disarmament while avoiding its pitfalls. Below I will detail the dangers of complete disarmament and the advantages of this plan. The essential problem with this idealistic goal is the sheer military power of nuclear weapons. Any lone nuclear power willing to use its weapons could demand pretty much whatever it wanted. Even now countries are willing to risk invasion or military strikes to just be one of many nuclear countries. The prospect of being the lone nuclear power would be just too much for many countries to resist, certainly if it is only international disapproval that they will face. Despite the lack of the huge military advantage provided by nuclear weapons genocide still seems to keep happening despite international moral disapproval (though not action) which is about as strong as one can get. So long as many countries still view military might as desirable and its use a live option, i.e., we don’t have world peace, the idea that international pressure would deter proliferation is implausible.

Certainly the present international system is in no shape to pressure a country not to develop a nuclear weapon. We couldn’t even make Iraq open up to inspections before an army was sitting on his doorstep and they didn’t even have any nuclear weapons to hide. Perhaps in the future we will have a more effective sanctions system but even still without military punishment it is quite likely countries would be willing to simply endure censure for the time it took to make their nukes. The United States went from nothing a a nuclear weapon in 5 years and the march of technology and the dissemination of knowledge will only continue to shorten this time. Once a nuclear power they use this power to occupy whatever territory they desire and offer to dismantle their arsenal in return for the elimination of whatever sanctions of punishments the international community have inflicted. If the international community is not willing to resort to force they really have no choice but to accept this offer. They have no other leverage to get the rogue state to give up its weapon and if they stay nuclear the whole system collapses.

If we suppose the international community is prepared to use force either as a punishment/deterant or as a means to destroy active nuclear weapon programs then the outlook may be a bit better, though countries with superior classical forces would likely be immune from such punishment. Perhaps a much strengthened system of inspections make the cost/benefit analysis come out negative for any country thinking of going nuclear, though this would require a willingness to punish countries that merely kick out inspectors or hide activities rather than waiting for proof. However, one must expect that some leaders won’t be entirely rational. Moreover, it is doubtful that we could ever have a regime of inspections reliable enough we could count on discovering any weapons research before it produces a weapon.

While a much better funded IAEA might be able to enforce the NPT to this degree the whole game changes when you have to stop some of the richest most technologically advanced countries in the world from recreating their nuclear capability. Additionally every year technological advancement makes creating nuclear weapons that much easier. While I believe ElBaradei’s approach is to do an end run around the worry of detection by strictly controlling any nuclear materials that might be used to create a bomb this promises to be quite difficult. It is one thing to stop countries with limited nuclear know-how from getting access to enriched uranium, plutonium or reactors/reactor fuel which might be used to create them. It is entirely another thing when trying to prevent countries like the US, China or Russia who have plenty of experience may have scientific knowledge in this area the IAEA lacks from secretly re-arming. It seems entirely possible that a sophisticated country could assemble triggering devices for hydrogen bombs from non-standard and unmonitored (old waste) fissile material. Finally, of course, the biggest danger with this system is that it is totally dependent on the efficacy of an UN agency. Future corruption, incompetence or funding cuts would all gravely imperil this scheme.

Additionally there is always the very real possibility that the nuclear powers haven’t been totally forthcoming with the size of their nuclear arsenals and would retain a few hidden weapons. Of course if we are willing to trust the major world powers not to hide weapons, surreptitiously rearm themselves or give other countries aid in developing nukes then I think, backed up by force, such a system might be able to work. However, if we are going to trust the world powers why not trust a few safe-keeping nations to keep a small reserve/deterrent arsenal in a disassembled form? This would actually result in a smaller risk of nuclear conflict because it doesn’t dramatically increase the benefits of going nuclear the way total disarmament does. Nor does it risk accidental war where two supposedly non-nuclear countries mistakenly escalate their dispute into a full blown nuclear conflict thinking their for doesn’t have nukes. Most importantly one country who breaks the rules would not unravel the entire arms control regime if a few reserve weapons are kept the way it would if we had total disarmament. If a single country develops nukes (or is even suspected of making nukes) in a totally disarmed world other nations will have no choice but to develop their own weapons. However, if one of the nations anointed for nuclear safekeeping could instead step in and guarantee to respond in kind to any first strike proliferation does not need to snowball.

Of course the selection of the safe-keeping nations is absolutely critical. While on a purely apolitical perspective the best choice might be the nuclear powers since we are effectively trusting them anyway this risks alienating the non-nuclear countries from the non-proliferation agreements. By making sure all countries are considered for this role based on the same criteria the fairness based appeal of total disarmament could be had without the risks. Additionally it is important that they represent a diverse collection of countries so every unarmed state can be confident some safe-keeping nation is not so antagonistic to them that they won’t fulfill their deterrence function on their behalf.

Finally we come to the critical question. Would allowing these countries to keep weapons, even in dismantled form, present too much of a risk of nuclear war? I think not, at least if this scheme was going to work in the first place. If we create such a strong sense of disapproval of nuclear weapons no country would develop them this same effect should prevent the safe-keeping countries from using the weapons. Moreover, since the weapons are held in trust they would not necessarily be viewed as part of a country’s military defense. In fact they should probably be specifically prohibited from being under military control. Ultimately if the most stable and responsible countries we can select cannot avoid deploying nuclear weapons despite the possibility the other safe-keeping nations would respond in kind I don’t see there being much hope of lasting worldwide disarmament.

Total disarmament makes for a nice sounding ideal, and in the very long run it is desirable. Once an effective world government exists or the thought of a war between nations is as absurd as that of a war between California and Oregon we can finally remove this radioactive sword of Damocles from the world but until then it seems to create more risk than averts.

In fact far from reducing the risk of nuclear conflict I think the CTBT actually increases this risk. The CTBT does little over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to further discourage proliferation. What it does do is increase the uncertainty over a countries nuclear arsenal and its effectiveness. As a quick game-theoretic style consideration reveals countries with only a 50/50 chance of having working nuclear weapons may in fact be far more dangerous than those countries with known nuclear capability. While one might think important concerns like this would be addressed by proponents of the CTBT but even relatively reputable advocates seem to have been distracted by the ideological battle. I will walk through the arguments below but ultimately I think it is a very bad idea to risk a greater likelihood of nuclear conflict just to make a statement.

Summary of CTBT

If you are unfamiliar with the CTBT a detailed summary of its contents is available from the Union of Concerned Scientists. A quick overview is that the CTBT bans “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.” Although not defined in the treaty the US has interpreted this to mean that no test involving nuclear material can go critical. In addition to banning this activity the CTBT also sets up an international monitoring system of seismic, infrasound, radionuclide and hydroacoustic monitoring stations to verify compliance.

CTBT and Proliferation

The first point which should be noted is that the CTBT does nothing to prevent the proliferation of Hiroshima type fission weapons. Either nations already have such weapons or are precluded from developing them by the NPT. Any test discovered to be in violation of the CTBT would also be in violation of the NPT for a non-nuclear power. It seems wholly implausible that a state intent of violating the NPT and which felt a test was necessary for their nuclear program would be deterred because it was now violating two treaties instead of only one. More importantly explosive tests are simply not necessary to develop a simple fission device. Both the plutonium and uranium bombs developed in the 40s by the US worked the first time and there is every reason to believe other countries could duplicate this feat especially with the benefit of 60 years of scientific advancement.

Could the CTBT then prevent the development of fusion weapons (H bombs) by nuclear powers? Perhaps in theory but of the declared nuclear powers, i.e., the countries which wouldn’t be seen as violating the NPT by testing a weapon, only Pakistan and arguably India do not already posses fusion weapons. Given the willingness of these two countries to blatantly violate the NPT when they viewed it as necessary for their nuclear programs casts doubt on the ability of the CTBT to prevent them from developing fusion bombs. Moreover, if preventing escalation from fission to fusion devices is the benefit of the CTBT the same end could presumably be achieved by an NPT2 which committed fission powers not to escalate without incurring the dangers of the CTBT.

I’m unsure if preventing escalation to fusion weapons is even a desirable goal. In the present world climate I think it is a small scale nuclear exchange destroying several cities which is the greatest risk. Countries facing only a few fission blasts, perhaps not powerful enough to penetrate the bunkers protecting their leaders, may be much more likely to risk a nuclear conflict than those facing total annihilation and personal death from fusion weapons. Cold calculations like the one Von Neumann made advocating a first strike on the Soviet Union are much more aggressively inclined when a country is only facing a few relatively small fission devices. However, while the military impact of a few fission devices may be minor their humanitarian impact would not be. In the relevant situation of India and Pakistan it certainly seems plausible that both sides would be more willing to play a game of nuclear brinksmanship if they thought their opponent could only deploy fission bombs.

Still while we might debate about whether it is more dangerous to have India and Pakistan armed with only fission weapons or both possessing fusion devices we should all be able to agree the most dangerous situation of all is for them to both possess fusion devices while thinking the other one only has fission bombs or worse no working bombs at all. In general whenever we decouple the danger of nuclear war from its deterrent potential risk of a nuclear conflict radically increases. If India thinks that Pakistan has no credible nuclear deterrent it might risk a provoking military action. If India has miscalculated this could easily lead to a nuclear exchange neither side would have wanted.

This is the great danger of the CTBT. It is unlikely to further deter clandestine programs to develop nuclear armaments but it may create a climate unfavorable to any public demonstration of those arms. This could easily lead to situations where opponents underestimate each others nuclear capabilities with disastrous consequences. While nuclear threats may be unpalatable they are an infinitely preferable option to real nuclear exchanges. I know I would much rather see Israel detonate a nuclear device as a threat to discourage a muscular Arab neighbor than be deterred by the CTBT and be forced to use such a weapon for real in response to an invasion.

Other Concerns

So if the CTBT does increase the risk of a nuclear exchange in these situations is their any other benefit it might provide which could still outweigh these disadvantages? Looking at the arguments for the CTBT aside from the vague claim it would prevent nuclear proliferation we have already examined two other benefits are claimed. First that a ban on nuclear testing would protect the environment and secondly that it would halt development of a new round of nuclear devices by major nuclear powers.

No doubt nuclear testing poses and environmental hazard but could this environmental concern possibly be of the same import as the risk of a nuclear exchange? I think not. Even a small nuclear exchange would have such devastating human and environmental cost that just a slight increase in the risk of such an exchange outweighs any environmental concerns raised by testing. Moreover, the environmental impact of testing can be minimized by other treaties that demand countries test only in a responsible fashion without risking the harms of the CTBT.

Low and No Yield Weapons

Discouraging the development of new nuclear gadgets by the US and other major nuclear powers is the only serious benefit that might be claimed by the treaty. Low yield or neutron bombs are the last thing the world needs. Any devices that blur the boundary between nuclear and conventional weaponry pose a very real danger. However, it is exactly in these cases where the CTBT is the least enforceable. In fact given the way the US has construed the CTBT only to apply to supercritical events and the advances in computer modeling it is entirely possible that such devices could be developed without violating the CTBT at all.

There is already some debate as to whether the CTBT can detect militarily significant nuclear tests. As the opponents of the test point out low yield nuclear tests would be indistinguishable from high explosives and might be disguised as other types of conventional military testing. I don’t find their arguments persuasive as they apply to countries trying to develop normal fission or fusion weapons. However, if we are talking about places like the US with a considerable collection of test data trying to develop low or no yield devices the possibility of successfully hiding the seismic signal seems quite real.

While the CTBT does offer other non-seismic types of verification there is every reason these could be circumvented by an advanced power like the US. Even worse the non-seismic means of verification require detection by nearby monitoring stations. In large countries like the US, China and Russia this means stations located inside their own borders and a competent intelligence service could probably infiltrate or otherwise corrupt the small number of stations necessary to detect such a test. Ultimately I think the verification portion of the CTBT would be effective in stopping tests for the purposes of building conventional large yield nuclear weapons. However, precisely because these low yield devices might blur the line between conventional warfare and nuclear conflict it is reasonable to suppose an advanced power could disguise them as traditional military tests.

Still one might think the subterfuge and possibility of detection might discourage some nations from pursuing such programs, especially democratic countries like the US where public scrutiny or concerned citizens might bring such a program to light. This is true but once again these benefits and more can be achieved without the risks of the CTBT. If we are going to rely on public pressure and the moral force of the treaty to ensure compliance why not simply have the treaty ban exactly the type of device which concerns us. A treaty which prevented any nation from developing neutron bombs or other nuclear devices with yields under a kiloton would garner all these advantages plus prevent the construction of such weapons without testing. In fact it is quite possible that such a treaty already exists.

Conclusion

Apart from symbolism the benefits for enacting the CTBT are scant and can be achieved through other, less dangerous, measures. Unfortunately no one seems to want to talk about the real complicated effects such a treaty might have. Like Kyoto the CTBT has become an ideological litmus test preventing any detailed consideration on its merits. It is entirely possible my analysis is wrong and the CTBT reduces nuclear risk for reasons which haven’t occurred to me. However, what I am sure of is that nuclear war is too serious to make decisions about on the basis of emotion or simplistic analysis which blindly assumes any decrease in the expected number of working nuclear weapons is clearly good. I’m inclined to believe the CTBT on the whole increases the risk of nuclear war but whether or not you agree with me surely it would be idiotic to support this sort of treaty without a detailed analysis of these type of game-theoretic concerns.